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This paper shows that social security may be an important factor in explaining the equity premium
puzzle. In the absence of shortselling constraints, the young shortsell bonds to the middle-aged and
buy equity. Social security reduces the bond demand of the middle-aged, thereby restricting the
possibilities of the young to ﬁnance their equity purchases. Their equity demand increases as does
the average return to equity. Social security also increases the covariance between future consumption
and the equity income of the young. The eﬀect on the equity premium is substantial. In fact, a model
with social security and borrowing constraints can generate a fairly realistic equity premium.
JEL Classiﬁcation G12 H55
Keywords: Asset prices, the equity premium puzzle, social security
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In 1985, Mehra and Prescott shed light on the question as to why the historical equity premium is so
high. They showed that the equity premium generated in a representative consumer framework is 0.35
percent at most, in contrast to the historical 6 percent in the U.S.1 This paper takes a life-cycle approach
and analyzes whether the pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) social security system could be an important factor in
the explanation of the so-called equity premium puzzle. The analysis is partly motivated by the equity
premium having been substantially higher since the introduction of the current U.S. PAYGO system in
1935. According to Mehra and Prescott (2003), the premium in the U.S. was 3.92 percent for the period
1889-1933, and 8.93 percent for the period 1934-2000.
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1Mehra and Prescott (1985).
1The potential importance of social security is mainly due to the considerable size of the program:
in 2001, social security was the major source of income (providing at least 50 percent of total income)
for 65 percent of the aged beneﬁciaries, and it was the only source of income for 20 percent of the aged
population in the U.S.2 In addition, social security is a non-traded asset containing several elements of
aggregate risk, thereby aﬀecting the ﬁnancial behavior of both taxpayers and retirees.
This paper sets up a simple three-period overlapping generations (OLG) model, where agents work
for two periods and retire in the third, and shows that social security unambiguously increases the equity
premium. Two social security arrangements with deﬁned beneﬁts are considered in this paper. First,
the U.S. system where agents receive wage-indexed beneﬁts based on their past income and second, the
more standard arrangement in macroeconomic models with constant and completely safe beneﬁts. The
eﬀect of social security on the equity premium is found to be substantial: up to 83 percent higher with
social security than without. Since equity in the model is a claim to all risky capital in the economy,
a realistic equity premium might be about 3 percent.3 The model with wage-indexed beneﬁts based on
past income, borrowing constraints and a relative risk aversion (RRA) coeﬃcient of 6 generates an equity
premium of 2.31, which is rather close to the target.
It turns out that the exact eﬀect of social security on the equity premium to a large extent depends on
whether agents are subject to shortselling constraints. In the absence of such constraints, social security
inﬂuences the equity premium by changing the relative demand for equity. When agents do not receive
social security, the young shortsell bonds and buy the bulk of the equity stock.4 Their marginal valuation
of equity is therefore decisive in the pricing process, and since they value equity highly, the return to
it is low. The middle-aged mainly hold bonds, but the diﬀerence in expected return between the two
assets is small. When agents do receive social security, the need to save for retirement is reduced. In
addition, since social security is a relatively safe asset, it reduces the motive to hold bonds for retirement.
Consequently, middle-aged agents’ demand for bonds goes down. The lower demand for bonds eﬀectively
2Fast Facts and Figures about Social Security (2003).
3Following Constantinides et al (2002).
4The large equity demand of the young is explained by the fact that they will receive some wage income in the next
period, wheras the middle-aged will receive zero exogenous income. The covariance between future consumption and equity
income is thus initiallty lower for the young than for the middle-aged. In the trading process, the middle-aged demand
bonds and the young demand equity to reduce this discrepancy.
2restricts the possibilities of the young to ﬁnance their equity purchases by shortselling bonds. Therefore,
they demand less equity and the price of equity goes down (and the return goes up).
The main inﬂuence of social security in the presence of shortselling constraints is due to the fact that
social security signiﬁcantly increases the covariance between future consumption and equity income for
the young.5 At the same time, the covariance between future consumption and equity income for the
middle-aged is relatively unaﬀected by social security. The higher covariance is ﬁrst of all due to the
arrangement with deﬁned beneﬁts featuring contra-cyclical taxes. More speciﬁcally, the government may
be forced to increase taxes when wage income is low, and vice versa. Since equity and wage income are
highly correlated, the young ﬁnd equity to be a worse hedge in economies with social security, since it
does not pay oﬀ when really needed. Their marginal valuation of equity will therefore be lower, whereas
the marginal valuation of the middle-aged remains relatively unchanged. The result is a lower equilibrium
price and a higher average return.
This paper adds to the literature on the importance of life-cycle eﬀects for the equity premium. Earlier
ﬁndings are that the equity premium is generally high when the equity is mainly priced by the middle-aged
who face a high covariance between their future consumption and equity income. The marginal valuation
of equity is low for this group, resulting in a high expected return to equity. A natural question is then
why the equity would be priced by the middle-aged. Constantinides et al (2002) argue that the young
would like to shortsell bonds and invest in equity, but ﬁnancial frictions such as shortselling constraints
may prevent them from this. Storesletten et al (2001), on the other hand, argue that the young actually
choose not to hold equity, since they ﬁnd it too risky. This paper oﬀers an explanation in-between the
two.6 As in Constantinides et al (2002), the young would like to shortsell bonds and invest in equity.
However, social security reduces the middle-aged agents’ demand for bonds and thus, the amount of
bonds the young can shortsell. As a result, the young choose to reduce their equity demand.
Finally, even though the model with social security and shortselling constraints may be viewed as
5Recall that the Consumption Capital Asset Pricing Model (C-CAPM), predicts that the price of an asset should depend
on the covariance between future consumption and the return to that asset. An asset paying oﬀ in states of high marginal
utility of consumption commands a higher price than one paying oﬀ in states of low marginal utility of consumption.
Moreover, marginal utility of consumption varies inversely with consumption, implying that the asset paying oﬀ in states
of low levels of consumption command a higher price than the asset paying oﬀ in states of high levels of consumption.
6Both Constantinides et al (2002) and Storesletten et al (2001) abstract from social security.
3successful, neither shortselling constraints nor social security alone found to generate an equity premium
of realistic size. This paper is also related to Abel (2003), who analyzes the price of capital in the presence
of social security; and to the large literature on the eﬀects of social security on individual and aggregate
savings.7
2 The Economic Model
2.1 The Consumers
The basic model used is an overlapping-generations, pure exchange economy where each generation
lives for three periods as young, middle-aged and old, respectively. Each generation is modeled by a
representative consumer. There is one consumption good in each period, which perishes at the end of the
period. Wages, consumption, dividends and coupons as well as bond and equity prices are denominated
in units of the consumption good. The wage income process in the economy is stochastic and exogenous,
so I am abstracting from the labor-leisure trade-oﬀ. The index i =0 ,1 and 2 is used to denote the young,
the middle-aged and the old, respectively. A consumer born in period t receives the wage income wt,0 > 0
when young, wt+1,1 > 0 when middle-aged and a social security beneﬁt b ϕt+2,2 ≥ 0 when old.
There are two types of securities in the economy, bonds and equity. Both are in unit supply and
inﬁnitely lived. The bond is default-free and pays a ﬁxed coupon b>0 in every period in perpetuity.
With this set-up, the bond can be considered as a proxy for long-term government debt. The ex coupon
bond price in period t is denoted by qb
t, and it is the price of the claim to the coupon b paid in perpetuity
beginning in period t +1 .
The equity is a claim to a dividend stream in perpetuity and pays a net dividend dt in period t.T h e
ex dividend price of equity in period t is denoted by qe
t, and it is the price of the claim to a perpetual
dividend stream, beginning with period t+1. Equity is here considered as the total sum of the claims to
ﬁrms and real estate.
The consumer born in period t has zero endowment of assets. This consumer makes a portfolio
7See, for instance, Feldstein (1974, 1996), who argue that social security crowds out private savings; and Hugget (1996),
Hugget & Ventura (2000) and Domeij & Klein (2002) who argue that social security can explain a large degree of the














and sells the portfolio in period t+2, when old. As usual, a negative position in bonds or stocks denotes
a short position in that asset.
In period t, the young consume ct,0, the middle-aged consume ct,1 and the old consume ct,2.D e n o t e
the tax rate by θt, and the social security beneﬁt received by the old by ϕt. The budget constraints in
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where (1),(2) and(3) are the budget constraints faced by the period t young, middle-aged and old,
respectively, and b ϕt are net social security beneﬁts.





where γ>0 is the constant coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion. For an agent of age i ∈ {0,1}, the
Bellman equation to the consumer’s problem is then given by





subject to the relevant budget constraints given by (1)-(3), where β is the subjective discount factor.
It is also assumed that
Vt,3 ≡ 0 ∀t,
5which implies that the old do not buy any assets (and that altruistic bequests are ruled out).
Aggregate income is deﬁned as
yt = wt,0 + wt,1 + b + dt. (6)
Following Constantinides et al (1998), the deﬁnition of income includes the (constant) coupon payment
on government debt.8
2.2 The Government Sector
Three diﬀerent social security arrangements are considered in this paper, beginning with the benchmark
case with no social security. Naturally, the government sector is then completely abstracted from, so both
taxes and beneﬁts are set to zero. Second, I deal with the U.S. Social Security System with wage-indexed
beneﬁts based on past income and third and ﬁnally, the case with completely safe beneﬁts. The last two
cases are discussed and modeled in detail below.
2.2.1 The U.S Social Security System
The U.S. Social Security System is basically a PAYGO system, where the government collects taxes
and pays out wage-indexed beneﬁts, based on past income to the currently old. The system features
deﬁned beneﬁts. More speciﬁcally, there are basically three important factors determining the social
security beneﬁts received by agents in the U.S.: the agent’s average income, the replacement ratio and
the evolvement of average wages.9 The ﬁrst factor is important because the level of beneﬁts when
reaching the retirement age is based on lifetime earnings. For each worker, there is a calculation of the
worker’s Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME) - an average of a worker’s earnings over the best
35 years of her career. One period is assumed to be 20 years in the model and each worker supplies
labor for two periods, i.e. a total of 40 years. For simplicity, averages are computed over these 40 years
8This is somewhat non-standard, but the assumption allows me to completely abstract from the government and thus
from taxes to ﬁnance the debt in the no-social security version. In any case, the interest on government debt in the U.S.
is about 3 percent of GDP and the calibration remains essentially unchanged notwithstanding if the deﬁnition of GDP
includes the term b.
9See, for instance, the Social Security Handbook.
6rather than just the 35 best years. The average income history of an agent aged i is denoted by ψt,i.
Formally, ψt,2 ≡
wt−2,0+wt−1,1
2 is the average (pre-taxed) lifetime earnings of the period t old. The second
determinant of the social security beneﬁts is the replacement ratio, i.e. the rate at which social security
replaces past earnings. This parameter will be denoted by η. Finally, the rate of return on social security
is related to the aggregate wage-index, i.e., the evolvement of aggregate labor income. More speciﬁcally,
an individual’s earnings are indexed to the average wage level at the time of retirement.10 The variability
of this index over time inﬂuences the variability of beneﬁts, and its comovement with other assets will be
important for portfolio composition. The (pre-taxed) social security beneﬁt of an agent retiring in period
t is then






Thus, if the wage rate in period t is above its unconditional mean, beneﬁts are increased proportion-
ately.
The government is required to balance its budget in each period. Budget balance in combination with
deﬁned beneﬁts implies that the tax rate will be a stochastic variable, taking on whatever value is needed
to keep the government budget in balance. In contrast to the complex means by which taxable beneﬁts
are determined in the U.S., beneﬁts are, for simplicity, taxed at the period-t income tax rate θt.T h e
government budget constraint is then
θt (wt,0 + wt,1 + ϕt) ≥ (1 − θt)ϕt. (9)
It is then straightforward to use (7), (9) and the fact that the government balances the budget to
10Actually, an individual’s earnings are indexed to the average wage level 2 years prior to the year of eligibility, i.e., when
the agent attains the age of 62.
7write the tax in period t as
θt =
ηψt,2c Wt
wt,0 + wt,1 +2 ηψt,2c Wt
. (10)
2.2.2 Safe Beneﬁts
A natural benchmark may also be the case with completely safe beneﬁts, more speciﬁcally, a setting
where all old agents receive the same beneﬁt and, consequently, do not face any uncertainty in their
exogenous income. This is probably the most common assumption when modeling social security in
macroeconomic models. Since a set-up with deﬁned beneﬁts is considered, taxes are stochastic, and since
beneﬁts are assumed to be constant, they cannot be taxed. Instead, retirees receive a beneﬁte q u a lt ot h e
unconditional expected value of the after-taxed beneﬁt in the model with wage-indexed beneﬁts based
on past income. The completely safe beneﬁti sg i v e nb y











t is the period-t tax rate in the economy, with wage-indexed beneﬁts. Finally, taxes paid by








Implications for equity prices are analyzed both with and without shortselling constraints. First, Con-
stantinides et al (2002) have argued that shortselling constraints may have important implications for
asset prices, and the equity premium in a life-cycle setting. Second, borrowing constraints can be mo-
tivated on grounds of realism: it is a well known fact that human capital alone does not collateralize
major loans in modern economies, for reasons of moral hazard and adverse selection. The borrowing-
unconstrained economies, on the other hand, may be viewed as natural benchmark cases. In short, in
borrowing-constrained economies, agent i ∈ {0,1} is subject to the following two additional constraints
8zb
t,i ≥ 0 and ze
t,i ≥ 0 ∀t. (13)
3 Equilibrium
Instead of specifying joint stochastic processes for wage income and dividends (dt,w t,0,w t,1), I specify
processes for aggregate income and wage income (yt,w t,0,w t,1).M o r e s p e c i ﬁcally, the joint process of
the detrended aggregate income and the wage income of the young and the middle-aged is modeled as a
time-stationary process. Since each of these variables will only be allowed to take on a ﬁnite number of
values, the triple (yt,w t,0,w t,1) can be represented by the state variable st = j, j ∈ J.T h i sv a r i a b l ei s
modeled as a Markov process with a non-degenerate, unique, stationary probability distribution with the
transition probability matrix π =( πij), and is referred to as the ”income state”. It is then straightforward
to represent a stationary equilibrium, wherein decisions made in period t and prices in period t are
functions of the current income state j,a n dt h eone period lag of the investment decisions of the middle-






. However, in the economy with wage-indexed beneﬁt sb a s e do np a s t
income, agents also need to keep track of the average income history of the currently old ψ2 (j−1,j −2)
and middle-aged ψ1 (j,j−1).




0 (j,z−1,ψ2,ψ1) and ze
1 (j,z−1,ψ2,ψ1), such that the fol-
lowing conditions hold:






• The government budget constraint (9) is satisﬁed with equality
The ﬁrst condition ensures that each consumer’s consumption and investment policy maximizes her
expected utility from the set of admissible policies (while taking the price process as given) and the
second condition ensures that the bond and equity markets clear in all periods. Note that by Walras’
law, condition (2) ensures that goods markets clear.
9Naturally, in the presence of shortselling constraints, the following additional conditions must also
have to be satisﬁed: zb
i ≥ 0 and ze
i ≥ 0 i =0 ,1,2.
4 Numerical Computation of the Equilibrium
In the calibration, y will only be allowed to assume four diﬀerent values. In addition, since it is computa-
tionally costly to keep track of income histories, w0 and w1 are only allowed to take on two values each.
More speciﬁcally, I assume the following aggregate structure:
J =

          
          










,(wi (1 + ζ))
(y + v),(wi (1 + ζ))
i =0 ,1,
where y is the average aggregate income and wi, the average wage income of an agent aged i. Since wages
of the young and middle-aged both can be high and low, it follows that ψ2 is a variable with four possible
values. Finally, for a given realization of j ∈ J,t h ev a r i a b l eψ1 c a na t t a i nt w od i ﬀerent values, resulting
in a total of 32 diﬀerent exogenous states.11 The stochastic process is assumed to be i.i.d.o v e r t i m e .
Although it is well established that aggregate productivity shocks are highly autocorrelated at annual and
quarterly frequencies, there does not seem to exist any conclusive evidence indicating such positive serial
correlation at generational frequencies (i.e. 20-30 year periods).12 As a benchmark, aggregate shocks in
the model are therefore uncorrelated across time. Moreover, it is assumed that π1 = π4 and π2 = π3.
Since no closed-form solutions for portfolio policy functions and pricing functions exist, these functions
are approximated by B-splines of order 4 (i.e. piecewise cubic polynomials). The system of equations is
solved with a Gauss-Jacobi approach.
11The numerical approximation then features more than 40000 unknowns.
12This assumption is also in line with several other papers analyzing OLG-models with two or three periods. See, for
instance, Bohn (1999) and Smetters (2002).
105 Calibration
The preference parameters are the RRA coeﬃcient, γ and the subjective discount factor, β.R e s u l t sa r e
presented for the values γ =4and 6 of the RRA coeﬃcient. The discount factor is set to 0.44 for a
period of 20 years. This corresponds to an annual subjective discount factor of 0.96, which is standard
in the macro-economic literature.
In the U.S., the current payroll tax is 12.4 percent, and the replacement ratio is 44 percent.13 The
ratio of retired individuals to working people is somewhat higher in the model (0.5) than in the U.S.
today (0.25), making it diﬃcult to simultaneously match the payroll tax and replacement ratio. I set out
to match the empirically observed replacement ratio of 44 percent, i.e. η =0 .44. The expected tax rate
needed to ﬁnance this ratio is E (θ)=0 .152.
There are 6 additional parameters to be determined: y,v,w0,w1,ζ,π1.14 These parameters are chosen
to satisfy the following 6 target statistics.





. This statistic was set to be in the
interval 0.66 − 0.75, consistent with US historical experience.
(ii) The average share of the wage income going to the young w0
w1.A c t u a li n c o m ep r o ﬁles from
Storesletten et al (2003) are used to calibrate this statistic to be 0.75.15 Since wt,0 and wt,1 are
assumed to be perfectly correlated, the ratio w0
w1 equals 0.75 in each period.
(iii) T h ea v e r a g es h a r eo fi n c o m eg o i n gt oi n t e r e s to ng o v e r n m e n td e b t , b
E(y).T h i sw a ss e ta t
0.03, consistent with US historical experience.
(iv) The coeﬃcient of variation of the 20-year aggregate income,
σ(y)
E(y). This statistic is rather
problematic to calibrate since even a century-long time series only provides ﬁve non-overlapping
observations, resulting in large standard errors of the point estimates. I follow Constantinides et al
(2002), and calibrate this statistic to be 0.25.
13See, for example Mchale (1999).
14Since π1 + π2 + π3 + π4 =1 , the transition matrix is uniquely deﬁned by π1.
15Proﬁles are estimated from PSID data.
11(v) The coeﬃcient of variation of the 20-year aggregate wage
σ(W)
E(W). This vital statistic repre-
sents another calibration challenge for the reasons mentioned above. Against this background, I
once more stay close to Constantinides et al (2002), and calibrate the coeﬃcient of variation of the
20-year aggregate income to be 0.20.
(vi) The cross-correlation of aggregate labor income and aggregate income corr(yt,w t).W h e n
the production process is explicitly modelled, the standard assumption is the Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction function with its constant capital and labor shares. With a single productivity shock, the
implications are that labor, capital and aggregate income are all perfectly correlated. The Cobb-
Douglas production function has strong empirical support in the long run. According to Baxter
and Jermann (1997) and Bohn (1999), the returns to capital and labor are highly correlated in
the long run, thereby supporting the Cobb-Douglas assumption with constant factor shares. With
these ﬁndings in mind, I present results for corr(yt,w t)=0 .90 and 0.97.
Implied parameter values are stated in the Appendix. Since the equity in the model is the claim
not just to corporate dividends but to all risky capital in the economy, a realistic equity premium is,
according to Constantinides et al (1998) about 3 percent.
6 Simulation Results
All economies are simulated for 20000 periods and results from these simulations are presented in this
section16 T h em e a nr e t u r no fa na s s e ti sd e ﬁned as 100 x [{mean of the 20-year holding period return}1/20-
1]. The standard deviation of the equity or bond return is deﬁned as 100 x [std{20-year holding period
return}1/20]. The mean premium of equity return over the bond return is deﬁned as the diﬀerence of
the mean return on equity and the mean return on the bond. The standard deviation of the premium
of equity return over the bond return is deﬁned as 100 x [std{20-year equity return} - std{20-year bond
return}1/20].
16The case with corr (yt,w t)=0 .97 is presented in the Appendix. All economies were simulated for 21000 periods, but
the ﬁrst 1000 periods were discarded.
12Table 1: Simulation statistics
γ =4 , CORRELATION (W,Y )=0 .9
NO SHORTSELLING CONSTRAINTS
NO SOCIAL SECURITY SOCIAL SECURITY
- SAFE WAGE-INDEXED
MEAN EQUITY RET. 6.59 10.73 10.08
STD OF EQUITY RET. 5.1 5.98 5.33
MEAN BOND RET 5.77 9.6 8.93
S T DO FB O N DR E T . 4 . 5 4 5 . 3 6 4 . 6 8
MEAN PRM/BOND 0.82 1.13 1.15
STD PRM/BOND 1.55 2.00 1.97
EQUITY HELD BY THE YOUNG (%) 92 48 57
COV(c1, EQUITY RET.) 2.25 2.30 2.36
COV(c2, EQUITY RET.) 2.47 3.89 2.07
Table 2: Simulation statistics
γ =6 , CORRELATION (W,Y )=0 .9
NO SHORTSELLING CONSTRAINTS
NO SOCIAL SECURITY SOCIAL SECURITY
- SAFE WAGE-INDEXED
MEAN EQUITY RET. 6.33 12.66 11.51
STD OF EQUITY RET. 6.52 8.28 7.20
MEAN BOND RET 5.40 10.96 9.84
S T DO FB O N DR E T . 6 . 0 2 7 . 7 5 6 . 6 8
MEAN PRM/BOND 0.93 1.70 1.67
STD PRM/BOND 1.34 2.00 1.93
EQUITY HELD BY THE YOUNG (%) 128 52 63
COV(c1, EQUITY RET.) 1.99 2.12 2.17
COV(c2, EQUITY RET.) 3.49 4.41 2.43
The ﬁrst important observation across all cases reported in the tables is that social security raises
the equity premium. More speciﬁcally, the equity premium is up to 83 percent higher with wage-indexed
beneﬁts than without social security when agents are not borrowing constrained, and up to 37 percent
when they are. Tables 1 to 4 show that social security increases the equity premium through two main
channels: a demand eﬀect and a valuation eﬀect.
The main inﬂuence of social security on the equity premium in the absence of shortselling constraints
is due to the demand eﬀect, which is seen from the fact that social security considerably inﬂuences
the relative demand for equity. In the absence of social security, the young shortsell bonds and hold
between 90-130 percent of the total equity stock.17 Their marginal valuation of equity is thus decisive
17The large equity demand of the young is explained by the fact that they will receive some wage income in the next
period, wheras the middle-aged will receive zero exogenous income. The covariance between future consumption and equity
income is thus initiallty lower for the young than for the middle-aged. In the trading process, the middle-aged demand
bonds and the young demand equity to reduce this discrepancy.
13Table 3: Simulation statistics
γ =4 , CORRELATION (W,Y )=0 .9
SHORTSELLING CONSTRAINTS
NO SOCIAL SECURITY SOCIAL SECURITY
- SAFE WAGE-INDEXED
MEAN EQUITY RET. 6.54 10.76 10.04
STD OF EQUITY RET. 3.7 5.17 4.21
MEAN BOND RET 4.99 9.16 8.30
S T DO FB O N DR E T . 3 . 0 1 4 . 4 6 3 . 3 9
MEAN PRM/BOND 1.56 1.60 1.74
STD PRM/BOND 1.57 2.03 1.99
EQUITY HELD BY THE YOUNG (%) 12 15 13
COV(c1, EQUITY RET.) 0.41 0.97 0.72
COV(c2, EQUITY RET.) 3.93 3.62 3.48
Table 4: Simulation statistics
γ =6 , CORRELATION (W,Y )=0 .9
SHORTSELLING CONSTRAINTS
NO SOCIAL SECURITY SOCIAL SECURITY
- SAFE WAGE-INDEXED
MEAN EQUITY RET. 6.35 12.72 11.43
STD OF EQUITY RET. 4.14 6.90 5.32
MEAN BOND RET 4.62 10.50 9.12
S T DO FB O N DR E T . 3 . 5 1 6 . 2 5 4 . 5 6
MEAN PRM/BOND 1.73 2.22 2.31
STD PRM/BOND 1.50 2.08 2.05
EQUITY HELD BY THE YOUNG (%) 11 11 9
COV(c1, EQUITY RET.) 0.09 0.49 0.31
COV(c2, EQUITY RET.) 4.65 4.31 4.12
in the price process, and since they value equity highly, the return to equity is low in this economy.
The middle-aged mainly hold bonds, but the diﬀerence in expected return between the two assets is
small (less than 1 percent). When agents receive social security, they need not to save as much for
retirement. Consequently, the middle-aged agents’ bond demand is signiﬁcantly reduced. The lower
bond demand eﬀectively restricts the possibilities of the young to ﬁnance their equity purchases. As a
result, the young demand less equity and the price of equity goes down (and the return goes up). In fact,
social security reduces their equity demand by up to as much as 60 percent. The eﬀect on the equity
premium is substantial: it is up to 83 percent higher with wage-indexed beneﬁts, than without social
security. However, wage-indexed and safe beneﬁts generate the same equity premium in every important
respect. Moreover, social security does not inﬂuence the covariances between future consumption and
equity income in any signiﬁcant way. Basically, the covariance increases somewhat for the young, and
14decreases somewhat for the middle-aged.
The main inﬂuence of social security in the presence of shortselling constraints is due to the valuation
eﬀect. This can be seen from the share of equity held by the young being close to constant, indicating
that the relative demand for equity is almost unaﬀected by social security.18 However, social security
signiﬁcantly increases the covariance between future consumption and equity income for the young - up
to 6 times, as in table 9 in the Appendix. At the same time, the covariance between future consumption
and equity income for the middle-aged is relatively unaﬀected by social security. This is true for both
wage-indexed and safe beneﬁts. The higher covariance is ﬁrst of all due to deﬁned beneﬁts featuring
contra-cyclical taxes. More speciﬁcally, taxpayers are (at least sometimes) forced to pay higher taxes
when wage income is low and vice versa. Since equity and wage income are highly correlated, the young
ﬁnd equity to be a worse hedge in economies with social security because it does not pay oﬀ when really
needed. Their marginal valuation of equity is therefore lower, whereas their marginal valuation of the
middle-aged remains relatively unchanged. The result is a lower equilibrium price and a higher average
return. Second, contra-cyclical taxes make taxpayers’ consumption more volatile, which makes asset
prices more volatile since the price agents are willing to pay, will vary more between states. Notice that
both bond and equity returns are most volatile in economies with safe beneﬁts (where taxes are always
contra-cyclical), which also increases the covariance. As a result, agents demand a higher premium for
holding equities.19
The conclusion is that social security unambiguously increases the equity premium. None of the
model economies above generate a premium equal to 3 percent. However, the economy with borrowing
constraints, wage-indexed beneﬁts based upon past income and an RRA coeﬃcient of 6 has a premium
of 2.31 percent, which is fairly close to the target of 3 percent. Moreover, the equity is never priced
exclusively by the middle-aged when the model is calibrated with realistic income proﬁles. Instead, the
price of equity is always determined in the trading process between the young and the middle-aged.
Finally, social security seems to exacerbate the risk-free rate puzzle, since agents receiving social security
18It is still a fact that the young ﬁnd the equity very attractive and would like to invest in it. However, since their wage
income is lower in the present than in the future, they choose not to buy when prevented from borrowing.
19Naturally, this eﬀect is more pronounced when they are more risk averse.
15value marginal savings less, which leads to lower asset prices and higher returns.
7C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper ﬁnds that the pay-as-you-go social security system may be an important factor in the ex-
planation of the famous equity premium puzzle. The eﬀect of social security on the equity premium is
substantial: it is up to 83 percent higher with than without social security. In addition, a model with
wage-indexed beneﬁts based on past income, borrowing constraints and an RRA coeﬃcient of 6 can
actually generate a fairly realistic equity premium.
In the absence of shortselling constraints, social security inﬂuences the equity premium by changing
the relative demand for equity. When agents do not receive social security, the young shortsell bonds
and buy the bulk of the equity stock. The middle-aged mainly hold bonds, but the diﬀerence in expected
return between the two assets is small. When agents receive social security, the need to save for retirement,
especially in bonds, is reduced. Consequently, the middle-aged agents’ demand for bonds goes down. A
lower bond demand implies that the amount of bonds the young can shortsell to the middle-aged is
reduced. As a result, the young demand less equity and the price of equity goes down (and the return
goes up).
The main inﬂuence of social security in the presence of shortselling constraints is due to the fact that
social security signiﬁcantly increases the covariance between future consumption and equity income for
the young. At the same time, the covariance between future consumption and equity income for the
middle-aged is relatively unaﬀected by social security. The higher covariance is ﬁrst of all due to the
arrangement with deﬁned beneﬁts featuring contra-cyclical taxes. More speciﬁcally, the government may
be forced to increase taxes when wage income is low, and vice versa. Since equity and wage income are
highly correlated, the young ﬁnd equity to be a worse hedge in economies with social security, since it
does not pay oﬀ when really needed. Their marginal valuation of equity will therefore be lower, whereas
the marginal valuation of the middle-aged remains relatively unchanged. The result is a lower equilibrium
price and a higher average return.
This paper adds to the literature on the importance of life-cycle eﬀects for the equity premium. Earlier
16ﬁndings are that the equity premium is generally high when the equity is mainly priced by the middle-aged
who face a high covariance between their future consumption and equity income. The marginal valuation
of equity is low for this group, resulting in a high expected return to equity. A natural question is then
why the equity would be priced by the middle-aged. Constantinides et al (2002) argue that the young
would like to shortsell bonds and invest in equity, but ﬁnancial frictions such as shortselling constraints
may prevent them from this. Storesletten et al (2001), on the other hand, argue that the young actually
choose not to hold equity, since they ﬁnd it too risky. This paper oﬀers an explanation in-between the
two.20 As in Constantinides et al (2002), the young would like to shortsell bonds and invest in equity.
However, social security reduces the middle-aged agents’ demand for bonds and thus, the amount of
bonds the young can shortsell. As a result, the young choose to reduce their equity demand.
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18AA p p e n d i x
A.1 The Benchmark Calibration
The calibration in the benchmark case with corr (W,Y )=0 .9 is given by
Table 5: PARAMETER VALUES
yvw0 w1 ζπ 1
10 2.8 2.89 3.86 0.2 0.187
.
A.2 Tables
The results from the simulations with a higher correlation between wages and income are presented in
the tables below.
Table 6: Simulation statistics
γ =4 , CORRELATION (W,Y )=0 .97
NO SHORTSELLING CONSTRAINTS
NO SOCIAL SECURITY SOCIAL SECURITY
- SAFE WAGE-INDEXED
MEAN EQUITY RET. 6.71 10.81 10.12
STD OF EQUITY RET. 5.25 5.94 5.34
MEAN BOND RET 5.98 9.80 9.09
S T DO FB O N DR E T . 4 . 7 3 5 . 4 0 4 . 7 9
MEAN PRM/BOND 0.72 1.01 1.03
STD PRM/BOND 1.32 1.73 1.69
EQUITY HELD BY THE YOUNG (%) 98 45 58
COV(c1, EQUITY RET.) 2.23 2.17 2.28
COV(c2, EQUITY RET.) 2.55 4.25 2.08
Table 7: Simulation statistics
γ =6 , CORRELATION (W,Y )=0 .97
NO SHORTSELLING CONSTRAINTS
NO SOCIAL SECURITY SOCIAL SECURITY
- SAFE WAGE-INDEXED
MEAN EQUITY RET. 6.66 12.86 11.68
STD OF EQUITY RET. 6.52 8.33 7.25
MEAN BOND RET 5.84 11.40 10.24
S T DO FB O N DR E T . 6 . 0 6 7 . 8 6 6 . 7 9
MEAN PRM/BOND 0.82 1.46 1.45
STD PRM/BOND 1.17 1.69 1.65
EQUITY HELD BY THE YOUNG (%) 127 51 63
COV(c1, EQUITY RET.) 1.76 1.99 2.01
COV(c2, EQUITY RET.) 3.87 4.80 2.56
19Table 8: Simulation statistics
γ =4 , CORRELATION (W,Y )=0 .97
SHORTSELLING CONSTRAINTS
NO SOCIAL SECURITY SOCIAL SECURITY
- SAFE WAGE-INDEXED
MEAN EQUITY RET. 6.64 10.89 10.17
STD OF EQUITY RET. 3.73 5.20 4.20
MEAN BOND RET 5.32 9.55 8.67
S T DO FB O N DR E T . 3 . 0 9 4 . 5 9 3 . 4 9
MEAN PRM/BOND 1.32 1.34 1.50
STD PRM/BOND 1.32 1.74 1.72
EQUITY HELD BY THE YOUNG (%) 11 15 13
COV(c1, EQUITY RET.) 0.48 1.12 0.83
COV(c2, EQUITY RET.) 3.88 3.37 3.27
Table 9: Simulation statistics
γ =6 , CORRELATION (W,Y )=0 .97
SHORTSELLING CONSTRAINTS
NO SOCIAL SECURITY SOCIAL SECURITY
- SAFE WAGE-INDEXED
MEAN EQUITY RET. 6.53 13.01 11.73
STD OF EQUITY RET. 4.24 7.06 5.42
MEAN BOND RET 5.03 11.11 9.71
S T DO FB O N DR E T . 3 . 6 3 6 . 4 8 4 . 7 7
MEAN PRM/BOND 1.5 1.90 2.02
STD PRM/BOND 1.22 1.76 1.74
EQUITY HELD BY THE YOUNG (%) 10 11 8
COV(c1, EQUITY RET.) 0.11 0.65 0.41
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